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ABSTRACT
Advancing our understanding of software vulnerabilities, automating their identification, the analysis of their impact, and
ultimately their mitigation is necessary to enable the development of software that is more secure.
While operating a vulnerability assessment tool that we developed and that is currently used by hundreds of development units
at SAP, we manually collected and curated a dataset of vulnerabilities of open-source software and the commits fixing them.
The data was obtained both from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and from project-specific Web resources that we
monitor on a continuous basis.
From that data, we extracted a dataset that maps 624 publicly disclosed vulnerabilities affecting 205 distinct open-source Java
projects, used in SAP products or internal tools, onto the 1282 commits that fix them. Out of 624 vulnerabilities, 29 do not
have a CVE identifier at all and 46, which do have a CVE identifier assigned by a numbering authority, are not available in
the NVD yet.
The dataset is released under an open-source license, together with supporting scripts that allow researchers to automatically
retrieve the actual content of the commits from the corresponding repositories and to augment the attributes available for each
instance. Also, these scripts allow to complement the dataset with additional instances that are not security fixes (which is
useful, for example, in machine learning applications).
Our dataset has been successfully used to train classifiers that could automatically identify security-relevant commits in code
repositories. The release of this dataset and the supporting code as open-source will allow future research to be based on
data of industrial relevance; also, it represents a concrete step towards making the maintenance of this dataset a shared effort
involving open-source communities, academia, and the industry.
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Abstract—
Advancing our understanding of software vulnerabilities, au-
tomating their identification, the analysis of their impact, and
ultimately their mitigation is necessary to enable the development
of software that is more secure.
While operating a vulnerability assessment tool that we de-
veloped and that is currently used by hundreds of development
units at SAP, we manually collected and curated a dataset of
vulnerabilities of open-source software and the commits fixing
them. The data was obtained both from the National Vulnera-
bility Database (NVD) and from project-specific Web resources
that we monitor on a continuous basis.
From that data, we extracted a dataset that maps 624 publicly
disclosed vulnerabilities affecting 205 distinct open-source Java
projects, used in SAP products or internal tools, onto the 1282
commits that fix them. Out of 624 vulnerabilities, 29 do not have
a CVE identifier at all and 46, which do have a CVE identifier
assigned by a numbering authority, are not available in the NVD
yet.
The dataset is released under an open-source license, together
with supporting scripts that allow researchers to automatically
retrieve the actual content of the commits from the corresponding
repositories and to augment the attributes available for each
instance. Also, these scripts allow to complement the dataset with
additional instances that are not security fixes (which is useful,
for example, in machine learning applications).
Our dataset has been successfully used to train classifiers that
could automatically identify security-relevant commits in code
repositories. The release of this dataset and the supporting code
as open-source will allow future research to be based on data of
industrial relevance; also, it represents a concrete step towards
making the maintenance of this dataset a shared effort involving
open-source communities, academia, and the industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
While the availability of mature, high-quality open-source
software (OSS) components represents an opportunity for the
software industry to accelerate innovation and lower costs,
maintaining a secure OSS supply chain and an effective vul-
nerability management process remains a difficult challenge.
In recent years, several approaches to the management
of OSS vulnerabilities have emerged and even the market
of commercial tools has matured significantly. However, as
shown in [7], an effective vulnerability management approach
cannot rely purely on metadata (which are often inaccurate,
incomplete, or missing). Rather, it has to be code-centric, that
is, it must be based on the actual analysis of vulnerabilities
and their fixes at code level.
While operating a vulnerability assessment tool that we
developed to implement such code-centric approach, and that
is currently used by hundreds of development units at SAP,
we manually collected a substantial amount of code-level data
about vulnerabilities of open-source software and their fixes.
Starting from that data, and with the objective to study
automated approaches to simplify the expensive and difficult
problem of manually identifying the fixes for new vulner-
ability disclosures, we created a dataset, which we present
here, that was successfully used to train automated commit
classifiers [8].
Our dataset maps 624 publicly disclosed vulnerabilities
affecting 205 distinct open-source Java projects used in SAP
software (either products or internal tools) onto the 1282
commits that fix them. It was constructed and manually curated
over a period of four years, monitoring the disclosure of
security advisories, not only from the NVD, but also from
numerous project-specific Web pages.
Compared to existing works, our dataset has several distin-
guishing characteristics.
• Differently from [2], who constructed their dataset by
automatically extracting data from the whole NVD, we
manually curated the data of each vulnerability analyzed.
While the overall amount of vulnerabilities we could
cover is lower, by manually curating our dataset we could
ensure the quality of each entry, detecting and addressing
some of the inconsistencies that are known to affect the
NVD [6], and including many commits that could not be
found on the NVD. We estimate that over 70% of the
vulnerabilities in our dataset do not have any link to a
source code repository in their NVD page.
• Because the selection of the projects reflects the popu-
lation of OSS that are actually used in real enterprise
software products or internal tools, our dataset only
includes projects that have practical industrial relevance.
We are not aware of any other freely available dataset
that has this characteristic.
• Differently from [5], our dataset contains commits that
implement fixes to vulnerabilities, whereas theirs contains
commits that introduce vulnerabilities.
• Snyk1 does advertise its vulnerability databases through
its website. Such database is focused on vulnerability
descriptions and a reference to the fix is not always
included. Also, the access to the Snyk dataset is subject to
1https://snyk.io/vuln/
restrictions and their data are not available for free down-
load2. Our dataset instead is available under the Apache
license and its release is part of an initiative to promote
a collaborative effort involving industry, academia, and
the open-source community, to maintain and extend the
dataset in the long run.
In the next section, we present the process we followed
to construct the dataset, whose content is described in Sec-
tion III. Possible applications of the dataset are illustrated
in Section IV, while Section V presents some concluding
remarks.
II. DATASET CONSTRUCTION
The motivation for collecting code-level vulnerability data
originates in the work that SAP Security Research has per-
formed since 2014 on the analysis of vulnerabilities in open-
source software. A key result of that work is an approach to the
detection, assessment and mitigation of open-source vulnera-
bilities [7]. The approach is implemented as a tool (internally
called Vulas) that has been productively used at SAP to analyze
hundreds of Java and Python software applications and that is
now publicly available as free open-source software released
under the Apache version 2.0 license3.
The availability of a vulnerability knowledge base, that is
comprehensive, accurate, and updated in a timely manner, is
the prerequisite for such a tool to operate effectively. For
this reason, we continuously monitor both the NVD and
over 50 distinct project-specific websites for new vulnerability
disclosures. For each such disclosure, we manually review the
available information and we search for the corresponding fix-
commit(s) in the code repository of the affected open-source
component. The result of this ongoing activity, started in 2014,
is a database of vulnerability data that has a very high coverage
of the projects that are relevant to our company. From this
database, we extracted 1282 commits, from 205 distinct open-
source Java projects used in SAP software (either products or
internal tools). These commits correspond to the fixes of 624
publicly known vulnerabilities4.
III. DATASET DESCRIPTION
The dataset consists of a set of 4-tuples
(vulnerability id, repository url, commit id, class)
where vulnerability id is the identifier of a vulnerabil-
ity that is fixed in the commit with identifier commit id
performed in the source code repository at repository url.
Each entry of the dataset represents a commit that contributes
to fixing a vulnerability (so-called fix commits) and thus we
2Snyk stopped offering dumps of their vulnerability database on GitHub as
of February 2018.
3https://github.com/sap/vulnerability-assessment-tool
4The dataset we describe in this paper is a snapshot of our vulnerability
database taken on 21 January 2019; it is available as a comma-separated file
at https://github.com/SAP/vulnerability-assessment-kb/tree/master/MSR2019.
Some of the entries were discarded because the commits were invalid (e.g.,
some repositories had been dismissed or moved since we first introduced them
in the dataset).
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Fig. 1: Number of vulnerabilities per number of commits
performed for fixing them (note: the y-axis uses a logarithmic
scale).
assign them to the positive class (pos). In certain applications,
commits of the negative class (denoted by neg) are also needed
(see Section IV). Together with the set of positive instances,
we also provide supporting scripts to manipulate it and to
obtain negative instances automatically. Both the data and the
scripts are released under the Apache 2.0 license.
The dataset covers 205 distinct projects, and includes 1282
unique commits corresponding to the fixes to 624 vulnerabil-
ities. Differently from other existing datasets (e.g., [2]), our
dataset includes vulnerabilities that are not available at the
National Vulnerability Database, and that we obtained from
project-specific advisories. In particular the dataset includes 29
vulnerabilities without CVE identifier5, and 46 vulnerabilities
which have been given a CVE identifier by a CVE numbering
authority, but are not yet published on NVD.
The dataset can be considered to cover a representative
sample of projects of practical industrial relevance: these
projects were identified based on an analysis of the data
collected at SAP while operating our open-source vulnerability
assessment tool (internally known as Vulas) for a period of
about four years, during which the tool was used for hundreds
of thousands of security scans. Most of the open-source
projects included in the dataset are hosted on GitHub.com (or
a mirror of their official repository is available there).
The dataset is released as comma-separated values (CSV)
file, which makes it readily usable as input to scripts that
can fetch automatically additional data from each repository.
We do provide example code (in the form of a Jupyter
notebook and a few supporting Python scripts) that simplify
the manipulation, the extension, and the analysis of the dataset.
As shown in Figure 1, most of the vulnerabilities (364) are
fixed in a single commit whereas in 7 cases the number of
commits done to fix the vulnerability goes over ten, up to
twenty-three for CVE-2015-5348.
5CVE identifiers are the most-used naming convention used to enumerate
vulnerabilities.
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Fig. 2: Number of vulnerabilities per year.
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Fig. 3: Number of repositories per number of vulnerabilities
(note: the y-axis uses a logarithmic scale).
The existence of multiple commits per vulnerability may
indicate either that the fix is performed in steps (in which
case, the entire set of commits determines the fix), or that the
fix is back-ported to other versions (branches). In the latter
case, the fix could be replicated as-is, or it may be adpated to
make it compatible with older code. The top-20 vulnerabilities
by number of fix-commits is shown in Table I-a.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the vulnerabilities in the
dataset over the years. The bias towards recent years is due
to several reasons: (1) the number of vulnerabilities published
increases every year; (2) often the information available for
old vulnerabilities is very limited (e.g., dead reference links,
moved repositories no longer available); (3) as the dataset
is manually-curated, the effort spent to identify fix-commits
needs to be allocated carefully, and we give higher priority to
recent vulnerabilities.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of vulnerabilities across dif-
ferent repositories. In particular it highlights that the majority
of repositories (178 over 205) have only one vulnerability.
The top-20 projects by number of vulnerabilities are listed in
Table I-b
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Fig. 4: Number of days from fix commit to release (note: the
y-axis uses a logarithmic scale).
IV. APPLICATIONS
The dataset presented in this paper can be used to study
vulnerabilities and their fixes in open-source software of
industrial relevance (e.g., [4], [8]).
Using the scripts we distribute with the dataset, researchers
can easily clone all the repositories referred to in the dataset
and follow our code samples to extract any commit feature
available through Git.
As an example, for each fix-commit, we automatically
determine the oldest tag from which that commit is reachable
and compute the time elapsed between the two: this can
be used to study the time elapsing from the time when a
vulnerability fix is committed in a repository until a new non-
vulnerable release (containing such fix) is created (and tagged).
This can have important security consequences: because
an attacker could easily monitor issues and commits in the
repositories of security-relevant open source projects, it is
critical to keep this delay as short as possible. During that
time-frame, the fix (and thus the vulnerability that it fixes)
is public, but the clients relying on the affected open-source
project cannot update to a non-vulnerable release, because it
does not exist yet.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of such delays for the
commits in our dataset. The figure shows that most fix commits
(817) are released in less than 100 days (of which 181 are
released the same day), but delays can be much higher in a
considerable number of cases. Detailed information about how
many days occur from fix-commits to their releases is available
in Table I-c.
It is interesting to observe that as many as 167 commits are
not reachable from any tag (see last line in Table I-c). Since
most open-source projects follow the established practice of
creating a tag for each release, this figure might suggest that a
non-negligible number of fix-commits is available in the code
repository of the project but is not yet part of any release.
Another example of a possible application of the dataset
is presented in [8]. Motivated by the need to automate the
Vulnerability Id. Commits
CVE-2015-5348 23
CVE-2012-0022 15
CVE-2018-8009 13
CVE-2016-6801 13
CVE-2016-8749 12
CVE-2018-8027 12
CVE-2014-0119 11
CVE-2012-2098 10
CVE-2013-1768 9
CVE-2017-15719 9
CVE-2016-5641 9
CVE-2016-3674 8
CVE-2016-5018 8
CVE-2014-3558 8
CVE-2010-0432 8
CVE-2016-6796 8
CVE-2017-12617 8
CVE-2017-5664 8
CVE-2017-15695 7
CVE-2015-1833 7
CVE-2018-1335 7
(a)
Repository Vulnerabilities
https://github.com/apache/tomcat 69
https://github.com/apache/struts 44
https://github.com/apache/tomcat70 35
https://github.com/jenkinsci/jenkins 34
https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework 24
https://github.com/cloudfoundry/uaa 22
https://github.com/apache/tomcat85 20
https://github.com/apache/tomcat80 20
https://github.com/apache/activemq 18
https://github.com/apache/cxf 17
https://github.com/apache/tomcat55 16
https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java 15
https://github.com/apache/camel 13
https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project 13
https://github.com/apache/lucene-solr 11
https://github.com/apache/hadoop 9
https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security 8
https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind 8
https://github.com/apache/tika 7
https://github.com/apache/ofbiz 6
https://github.com/apache/nifi 6
(b)
Days # Commits
1 181
2 166
3 256
4 259
5 308
6 282
7 257
8 136
9 144
10 172
11 170
12 129
13 128
14 512
15 520
15 to 50 592
50 to 100 257
100 to 500 290
500 to 1000 72
1000 to 2000 19
No tag 167
(c)
TABLE I: Dataset description: (a) Number of fix-commits per vulnerability (top-20); (b) Number of vulnerabilities per repository
(top-20); (c) Number of commits per days elapsed between the the fix-commit and the following tag (release).
maintenance of the very vulnerability database from which
our dataset is extracted, Sabetta and Bezzi [8] presented a
novel approach to the automated classification of commits
that are security-relevant (i.e., that are likely to fix a vul-
nerability). They used (an older, and smaller version of) the
dataset presented here to train two independent classifiers,
considering, respectively, the patch introduced by a commit
(Patch Classifier) and the log messages (Message Classifier),
without relying on information from vulnerability advisories.
Inspired by the naturalness hypothesis [1], [3], the Patch
Classifier treats source code changes as documents written in
natural language (code-as-text), and it classifies them using
established Natural Language Processing (NLP) methods. A
similar approach is also used for the Message Classifier.
The results of the two classifiers, which are tuned for high
precision, are then combined with a simple voting mechanism
that flags a commit as security-relevant as soon as at least one
of the two models does.
As we pointed out in Section III, it is common practice
to commit the same change in multiple branches of the
same repository, so that the fix is made available to users of
different supported versions of the component at hand. As a
consequence of this practice, our dataset contains duplicates
(commits with different identifier but identical content) which
need to be removed before training a classifier. The de-
duplication results in 862 unique positive instances.
Generally speaking, datasets used to train automated clas-
sifiers must include commits corresponding both to security
fixes (positive class) and to other changes not related to
security (negative class). To support these applications, we
provide a script that, starting from the set of positive instances
at our disposal, augments the dataset with negative instances
(non-security commits). The algorithm works as follows: for
each positive instance p from repository R, we take k random
commits n1, . . . , nk from R and, under the assumption that
security-relevant commits are rare compared to other types
of commits, we treated these as “negative” examples. To
avoid including obvious outliers (extremely large, empty, or
otherwise invalid commits), we performed a manual review
of these commits, supported by ad-hoc scripts and pattern
matching (similarly to [9]). These patterns are used to speed-
up the manual review by searching for patterns in the commit
messages that would indicate with high probability that the
commit is security-related.
The model of [8] seems to represent an improvement over
a similar state-of-the-art approach [9] which relies on log
messages processed through a more complex architecture
trained with a different (and substantially larger) dataset.
Unfortunately, the dataset used in [9] is not public, which
makes it impossible to conduct a reliable comparison of the
two approaches.
We hope that, by sharing our dataset, we will encourage
further works to demonstrate the extent of their claimed
improvements on the basis of a common benchmark that
is freely available, machine-readable, and that covers open-
source projects of actual industrial relevance.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented a dataset of fixes to vulnerabilities
in Java OSS projects of industrial relevance, resulting from
our experience with developing and operating an open-source
vulnerability management solution at SAP.
While the data we are releasing at this time cover only
Java projects, in the meantime the tool has evolved to support
more languages and consequently we are working to extend
our dataset further.
To remain useful for the validation of enterprise appli-
cations in the long term, the dataset needs to be updated
on a continuous basis to incorporate new vulnerabilities as
soon as they are disclosed. While the current dataset has
been constructed at SAP, we are working to make its future
maintenance a community effort and to encourage the very
developers who implement the security fixes for vulnerable
open-source components to contribute to this dataset. To facili-
tate this community effort, we plan to release support tools and
processes, thus complementing the release of our vulnerability
assessment tool, which was open-sourced in October 2018.
We are convinced that the tool and its vulnerability database
represent a practical contribution to ensuring the security of
the open-source software supply-chain.
REFERENCES
[1] Miltiadis Allamanis, Earl T. Barr, Premkumar Devanbu, and Charles
Sutton. A survey of machine learning for big code and naturalness. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1709.06182, 2017.
[2] Antonios Gkortzis, Dimitris Mitropoulos, and Diomidis Spinellis. Vuli-
noss: A dataset of security vulnerabilities in open-source systems. In
Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Mining Software
Repositories, MSR ’18, pages 18–21, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM.
[3] Abram Hindle, Earl T. Barr, Zhendong Su, Mark Gabel, and Premkumar
Devanbu. On the naturalness of software. In Proceedings of the 34th
International Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’12, pages 837–
847, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2012. IEEE Press.
[4] Ivan Pashchenko, Henrik Plate, Serena Elisa Ponta, Antonino Sabetta,
and Fabio Massacci. Vulnerable open source dependencies: counting
those that matter. In Markku Oivo, Daniel Me´ndez Ferna´ndez, and
Audris Mockus, editors, Proceedings of the 12th ACM/IEEE International
Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement, ESEM
2018, Oulu, Finland, October 11-12, 2018, pages 42:1–42:10. ACM,
2018.
[5] Henning Perl, Sergej Dechand, Matthew Smith, Daniel Arp, Fabian
Yamaguchi, Konrad Rieck, Sascha Fahl, and Yasemin Acar. Vccfinder:
Finding potential vulnerabilities in open-source projects to assist code
audits. In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’15, pages 426–437, New
York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[6] Henrik Plate, Serena Elisa Ponta, and Antonino Sabetta. Impact assess-
ment for vulnerabilities in open-source software libraries. In Software
Maintenance and Evolution (ICSME), 2015 IEEE International Confer-
ence on, pages 411–420. IEEE, 2015.
[7] Serena Elisa Ponta, Henrik Plate, and Antonino Sabetta. Beyond meta-
data: Code-centric and usage-based analysis of known vulnerabilities in
open-source software. In IEEE International Conference on Software
Maintenance and Evolution (ICSME), Sept 2018.
[8] Antonino Sabetta and Michele Bezzi. A practical approach to the
automatic classification of security-relevant commits. In 34th IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Software Maintenance and Evolution (ICSME),
Sept 2018.
[9] Yaqin Zhou and Asankhaya Sharma. Automated identification of security
issues from commit messages and bug reports. In Proceedings of the 2017
11th Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software Engineering, ESEC/FSE
2017, pages 914–919, New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
